This paper analyzes provision of a di¤erentiated public good within an organization.
Introduction
This paper addresses the question of provision of a di¤erentiated public good within an organization. Think of this as departmental service in academia, for example. That might include committee work, seminar organizing, chair assignments, etc. All members of the organization prefer the public good to be provided rather than not, but might disagree about certain dimension or variety of the public good. In the context of the academia example, this might re ‡ect research …eld or methodological specialization which a¤ects the focus of seminar series or hiring priorities. A principal (department chair or median faculty member) assigns the public good provision to one of the agents (say, junior faculty members). A contributing agent then gets the opportunity to provide a public good variety he prefers. However, the public good provision involves certain costs for a contributing agent. At the same time, there might be certain bene…ts too. In the context of the previous example, running department seminar series requires time but also implies greater academic visibility (useful at earlier career stages) and probably teaching load reduction. Moreover, being a "good citizen" is always appreciated in academic departments and might be taken into account during tenure evaluation. Therefore, provision of some di¤erentiated public goods implies net costs for a contributing agent while provision of others implies net bene…ts. The agents then tend to avoid providing some public goods but value (and therefore compete for) the opportunity to provide others. What variety of the di¤erentiated public good will be provided in such an institutional environment?
To address this question, I develop a spatial model in which a principal assigns provision of a di¤erentiated public good to one of two agents. The principal prefers a moderate variety of the public good while the agents have more extreme opposite preferences. The public good provision implies either net cost or net bene…t for a contributing agent. Whether it is costly or not, as well as the principal's and the agents'preferences, is common knowledge.
The principal can adopt di¤erent selection procedures to choose an agent for the public good provision. Here, I analyze two selection processes commonly used within organizations.
Under the …rst, referred as appointment, the principal simply evaluates the agents given their preferences, and selects a contributor on the basis of this. Intuitively, under appointment, a selected agent would implement his preferred public good variety. The principal therefore appoints an agent with more moderate preferences over the di¤erentiated public good. Under the second selection procedure, referred as competition, the agents commit to public good varieties they would provide if selected. The principal thus selects an agent who announced a more moderate variety of the public good.
Consider now the agents'incentives in the competition stage. I show that if the net cost of public good provision exceeds the distance between the agents'most preferred varieties of the public good then the agents want to avoid being selected. Intuitively, in this case each agent wants his counterpart to provide her preferred public good variety rather than to incur a high cost of providing his own. Therefore, the agents will make themselves an unattractive choice by announcing extreme varieties of the public good. As a result, the principal will prefer appointment to competition.
However, if the net cost of public good provision is lower than the distance between the agents'most preferred varieties then the agents value the opportunity to provide this public good. Indeed, each agent prefers to incur a relatively low cost of public good provision rather than to let his counterpart implement her preferred option. I show that in this case, there is a unique equilibrium in the competition stage. If one agent is extreme and the other agent is relatively more moderate, this is an equilibrium with asymmetric announcements in which a more moderate agent announces his preferred variety and gets selected, while a more extreme agent announces any variety from a certain equilibrium interval. The principal is then indi¤erent between competition and appointment. If the agents'bliss points are extreme, this is an equilibrium with symmetric announcements in which each agent gets selected with probability one half and the announced varieties are more moderate than the bliss points.
The principal therefore prefers competition to appointment.
My results emphasize an important feature of competition procedure -announcement divergence in the case of costly public good provision. Indeed, a contributing agent would bear a cost of public good provision only if his gains in terms of a public good variety are large enough, implying that his announced variety is quite di¤erent from that of the other agent. Another important characteristic of competition procedure is the existence of equilibrium with asymmetric announcements in which one agent announces his bliss point and gets selected. Intuitively, if he announces a variety di¤erent from his bliss point then he can pro…tably deviate to its direction and still get selected for the public good provision. Thus, in an equilibrium with asymmetric announcements a selected agent necessarily announces his most preferred variety.
Finally, if the public good provision implies net bene…t for a contributing agent then the agents compete for the opportunity to provide this public good. Then in the competition stage, the agents will make themselves an attractive choice by announcing a preferred option of the principal. Actually, the present setting then simpli…es to a classical spatial model with policy-and o¢ ce-motivated agents analyzed by Wittman (1990) and Calvert (1985) , among many others. In equilibrium, both agents announce a preferred variety of the principal and each of them gets selected with equal probability. The principal thus prefers competition to appointment.
My results therefore suggest that competition procedure is preferred in the situations in which the costs of public good provision are lower than the agents'bene…ts from implementing a variety close to their bliss point. In turn, appointment is preferred in the cases in which the public good provision is relatively expensive and the costs exceed the agents'bene…ts from implementing a variety close to their bliss point.
Due to the nature of the public goods under consideration, I consider a somewhat restricted space of instruments available to the principal -she can just set up a contest but cannot o¤er a contract for provision of the public goods. To this extent, the paper is related to the literature on tournaments and contests, which addresses the issue of contest design (see Konrad 2009 for an introduction to this vast literature). The paper is also related to the literature on spatial political competition going back to the seminal work of Downs (1957) , who emphasized platform convergence in a framework with two o¢ ce-motivated political candidates. A further step was taken by Wittman (1977 Wittman ( , 1983 Wittman ( , 1990 ), Calvert (1985) and Roemer (1994) , who considered policy-and o¢ ce-motivated candidates. It has been shown that under full commitment, two policy-and o¢ ce-motivated candidates announce convergent platforms if the distribution of the voters'ideal policies is known (Wittman 1977 , Calvert 1985 , Roemer 1994 , Bernhardt et al. 2009 , Saporiti 2010 ). The present paper actually uses these results for the case in which public good provision implies net bene…ts for a contributing agent.
However, the case of spatial competition with net costs which I model here, has not been analyzed in this literature, to the best of my knowledge.
This paper also contributes to the literature on voluntary provision of public goods which goes back to the pioneering work of Samuelson (1954 Samuelson ( , 1955 . More recent classical references on pure public good provision include Bergstrom et al. (1986) , Andreoni (1988) , Cornes and Sandler (1996) , among many others. The net bene…t case studied here is also related to the literature on impure public good provision which assumes that agents gain certain private bene…ts from their own contribution (see Cornes and Sandler 1984 , 1994 , Glazer and Konrad 1986 , Holländer 1990 , Harbaugh 1998 , among many others). However, the present paper departs from a standard model of public good provision and analyzes a setting with di¤erentiated public good in which agents di¤er in their preferences over a public good variety to be provided. Di¤erentiated public goods have been studied by Economides and Rose-Ackerman (1993) to model situations in which citizens have varying tastes for public services. They demonstrate that privatization of di¤erentiated public good production is not optimal as it leads to too many producers supplying too much output (as compared to the socially optimal outcome). In contrast to their research, I disregard privatization issues and concentrate instead on the question of assignment of public good production within organizations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 proceeds with the formal analysis. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
Model
Consider a public good provision within organizations. Suppose moreover that a public good under consideration, denoted by x, is di¤erentiated and the set of feasible outcomes is a closed
A principal assigns the public good provision to one of the agents. I consider a benchmark case with two agents here. The principal and the agents strictly prefer the public good to be provided rather than not to be provided. However, they di¤er in their preferences over variety of the public good. In particular, I assume that the principal's bliss point is Thus, they want the public good variety to be close to their bliss point.
A contributing agent incurs a net cost of public good provision, denoted by C 2 R.
Negative C means that the agent actually bene…ts from the public good provision. I assume that the cost C and the agents'bliss points 1 and 2 are common knowledge.
The principal can adopt di¤erent selection procedures to choose an agent to provide the public good. Here, I consider two simple and rather common selection processes. Under the …rst, referred as appointment, the principal simply evaluates the agents' pro…les (i.e., their bliss points) and chooses a public good contributor on the basis of this. Under the second, referred as competition, the principal makes the agents compete by asking about a variety of the di¤erentiated public good they would provide if selected. I assume full commitment here such that once selected, a contributing agent implements the public good variety he has chosen in the competition stage. 1 1 One can also assume that if a contributing agent deviates from his announcement he loses credibility and therefore carries a reputational cost, which exceeds potential bene…ts from deviation.
The timing of events is as follows. First, the principal decides which selection procedure to adopt, appointment or competition. In the case of appointment, she selects one of the two agents and assigns the public good provision to him. The selected agent then provides the public good. In the case of competition, the agents announce to the principal which variety of the public good they would choose. The principal then judges the agents based on their announcements and selects one of them for the public good provision. Finally, the selected agent implements his announcement.
I search for a subgame perfect equilibrium by analyzing the game backwards. I consider the agents'and the principal's decisions under appointment procedure …rst, and under competition procedure second. I turn then to the principal's decision regarding the selection process. Finally, I discuss robustness of my results.
3. Analysis
Appointment
Under appointment procedure, the principal simply selects one of the agents to provide the public good. The analysis is straightforward in this case. I study the game backwards and start with a contributing agent's problem.
Agent's problem Denote by x i a di¤erentiated public good provided by agent i = 1; 2. If selected for the public good contribution, agent i chooses x i to maximize his net payo¤ given by
Obviously, the contributing agent then implements his own bliss point, x i = i .
Principal's problem I turn now to the principal's appointment problem. Given that once selected, an agent sticks to his bliss point, the principal then appoints an agent whose bliss point is closer to hers. Formally, the principal selects agent 1 if 1 + 2 > 1; agent 2 if 1 + 2 < 1; and is indi¤erent between the two agents if 1 + 2 = 1. The principal's utility is then
where i is a bliss point of the contributing agent.
I study next the case in which the principal adopts competition procedure to select a contributing agent.
Competition
Under competition procedure, the principal simply asks the agents which variety of the di¤erentiated public good they would choose if selected. Then the principal selects one of the agents to implement his announcement.
Principal's problem Consider …rst the principal's problem. Intuitively, the principal assigns the public good provision to an agent whose announced variety is closer to her bliss
. Now x i denotes the announcement of agent i. Then the probability of agent 1 being selected for the public good provision is
1 if x 1 < x 2 and x 1 + x 2 > 1, or x 1 > x 2 and x 1 + x 2 < 1;
The probability of agent 2 being selected is
As in the case of appointment, the principal's decision is rather "mechanical" here. Once the agents announce public good varieties x 1 and x 2 , the outcome of the selection process is decided.
Agents' problem The agents announce x i to maximize their expected net payo¤s i ( ) given by
I search for a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (x 1 ; x 2 ) such that
Nonpositive cost Consider …rst the case in which the net cost of public good provision is nonpositive, C 0. This actually means that the public good provision either implies net bene…t for a contributing agent (if C < 0) or at least is not costly for him (if C = 0).
Contributing to the public good provision then becomes valuable to the agents. The model is therefore reduced to a standard setting with policy-and o¢ ce-motivated agents analyzed by Wittman (1990) and Calvert (1985) , and predicts convergence to the bliss point of the principal,
. Each agent is then selected for the public good provision with probability one half. Intuitively, an agent realizes that in order to get selected, he has to sacri…ce his bliss point and to announce a public good variety which the principal would prefer to the other agent's announced variety. This drives convergence in equilibrium. The principal's utility is equal to 0 in this case.
Positive cost I turn now to the case in which the net cost is positive, C > 0. The public good provision then becomes unpopular. The agents value the assignment only as a means of implementing a public good variety close to their bliss points. Therefore, convergence does not occur in equilibrium. Indeed, no agent agrees to carry a cost of provision in exchange for a public good variety that can be implemented by the other agent. The following proposition emphasizes the non-existence of equilibrium with convergence. Proposition 1. When the public good provision implies net costs for a contributing agent, convergence does not occur in equilibrium.
Proof. This proposition is easily proved by contradiction. Suppose that in equilibrium the agents announce the same public good variety x 2 (0; 1). Each of them is selected with probability one half and obtains a payo¤ of jx i j C 2 , i = 1; 2. Each agent, however, has an incentive to deviate in order not to get selected and to obtain a payo¤ of jx i j, saving the expected net cost C 2 . Therefore, (x; x) is not an equilibrium. If the agents announce the same extreme varieties (0 or 1) then an agent deviating from that extreme variety will be selected with probability 1 or with probability Therefore, in this equilibrium, when C 2 (0; 1) the agents announce more moderate varieties than their bliss points 1 and 2 . The announcements are symmetric around 1 2 and at a distance of C from each other. Each agent gets selected with probability one half. The expected utility of the principal is C 2 . The expected payo¤ for agent i is equal to
No agent wants to deviate by announcing a more moderate variety and getting selected for the public good provision. The reason is that the gains in terms of implemented variety (which are less than C 2 ) do not compensate the losses in terms of net cost C 2 . Neither agent gains by announcing a more extreme variety and not being selected. This is because the gains in terms of net cost C 2 are equal to the losses in terms of implemented variety of the public good. When C = 1, the agents announce the most extreme varieties (0; 1). In this case, no agent wants to deviate by announcing a less extreme variety and getting selected, as the losses in terms of net cost I turn now to the characterization of equilibria in which the agents announce asymmetric varieties and one agent gets selected with probability one. The following lemma establishes an important property of equilibria with asymmetric announcements. Lemma 1. In an equilibrium with asymmetric announcements, the selected agent necessarily announces his most preferred variety of the public good.
Proof. This lemma is easily proved by contradiction. Suppose that there is an equilibrium in which the selected agent, say i, announces a variety x i 6 = i . Agent i, however, can always pro…tably deviate to the direction of his bliss point i by a small positive number " and still get selected. It follows that in an equilibrium with asymmetric varieties, the selected agent announces his bliss point.
An equilibrium (x 1 ; x 2 ) in which the agents announce asymmetric varieties must therefore have one of the two following structures:
The following proposition characterizes equilibria with asymmetric announcements.
Proposition 3. For the following values of C, 1 , 2 and x 2 , there is an equilibrium with asymmetric announcements ( 1 ; x 2 ) in which agent 1 gets selected for the public good provision:
For the following values of C, 1 , 2 and x 1 , there is an equilibrium with asymmetric announcements (x 1 ; 2 ) in which agent 2 gets selected:
It is important to stress here that in some cases there is a continuum of payo¤-equivalent equilibria with asymmetric announcements in which one agent, say i, announces his bliss point i , gets selected for the public good provision, and obtains a payo¤ of C, while the other agent, j, announces any variety from an equilibrium interval and obtains a payo¤ of j j i j, i; j = 1; 2, i 6 = j. I refer to such a continuum of payo¤-equivalent equilibria as one equilibrium, specifying that agent j can choose any platform from an equilibrium interval.
Note that the agents' problem is symmetric and therefore equilibria with asymmetric announcements are symmetric around 
1 . Agent 1 implements his bliss point and therefore obtains C. He has no incentive to deviate by announcing a more extreme variety and getting selected only with probability ii) When the net cost of public good provision equals the length of the set of feasible outcomes (C = 1), there is an equilibrium with extreme symmetric announcements (0; 1) for any 1 2 0; iii) When the net cost of public good provision is lower than the length of the set of feasible outcomes (C < 1), depending on the agents' bliss points there are either one or two equilibria. If the distance between the agents'bliss points does not exceed the net cost
; otherwise, this is an equilibrium with asymmetric announcements in which a less extreme agent announces his bliss point and gets selected and the other agent announces any variety from a certain equilibrium interval. Equilibria for C 2 (0; 1) are formally described in Table 2 Note that if the distance between the agents'bliss points is greater than the net cost C, i.e., 2 1 > C, or if one of the agents has an extreme bliss point, i.e., 1 = 0 or 2 = 1, then there is just one equilibrium for C 2 (0; 1). Otherwise, there are two equilibria. The reason is that when 2 1 > C, only the agent with a less extreme bliss point gets selected in an equilibrium with asymmetric announcements. If the agent with a more extreme bliss point gets selected, this cannot be equilibrium with asymmetric varieties since the agent with a less extreme bliss point would like to deviate to get selected. Indeed, the losses in terms of net cost C if selected are less than the gains in terms of implemented public good variety 2 1 . However, when 2 1 C, there are two equilibria with asymmetric announcements, since both the agent with a less extreme bliss point and the agent with a more extreme bliss point can be selected for the public good provision.
Consider …rst an equilibrium in which the agent with a less extreme bliss point gets selected. He does not have incentive to deviate in order to get selected with probability 1 2 or not to get selected at all. Indeed, by deviating he might avoid the cost of public good provision but incurs even larger losses in terms of implemented public good variety. The other agent does not have incentive to deviate either. Intuitively, since the agents'bliss points are not very distinct then in equilibrium, he su¤ers just a modest loss in term of implemented public good variety. By deviating he somewhat reduces this loss but carries even larger costs of public good provision.
The other equilibrium in which a less moderate agent announces his bliss point and gets selected is apparently more counterintuitive. Indeed, why wouldn't a more moderate agent deviate and announce his bliss point? He could then get selected and implement his preferred variety of the public good. But the same intuition works here. Since the agents' preferred varieties are rather moderate and not very distinct, the more moderate agent gets a rather small utility loss from the equilibrium variety of the public good. By deviating to his bliss point he would get selected, implement his bliss point, and therefore slightly increase his utility from the di¤erentiated public good. However, he would also incur the cost of public good provision C, which exceeds his gains from implementing his preferred variety 2 1 . I must emphasize again that an equilibrium in which a less moderate agent announces his bliss point and gets selected doesn't arise when the distance between the agents'bliss points exceeds the net cost of public good provision. In this case, a more moderate agent could pro…tably deviate to his bliss point as his gains in terms of implemented public good variety would exceed the net cost of public good provision.
Principal' s Decision regarding Selection Process
I turn next to the principal's decision regarding the selection procedure. Given the agents' bliss points 1 and 2 , and the net cost of public good provision C, the principal chooses between appointment and competition. In what follows, b denotes a more moderate bliss point out of 1 and 2 .
Under appointment, a more moderate agent ends up providing his preferred public good variety. The principal's utility is then equal to b The …rst line corresponds to the case in which the net cost of public good provision is larger than the set of feasible outcomes, C > 1. In this case, under competition the agents make themselves an unattractive choice by choosing extreme varieties of the public good.
The principal therefore prefers appointment to competition.
The second line re ‡ects the case in which the net cost of public good provision equals the set of feasible outcomes, C = 1. Under competition, for any pair of the agents' bliss points 1 and 2 , there is an equilibrium with extreme announcements as in the previous case. Moreover, there might be other equilibria for some 1 and 2 . But in none of those the principal's payo¤ exceeds b Finally, the last line of the table deals with the case of nonpositive production costs, i.e., bene…ts (C 0). Here, under competition the agents want to make themselves an attractive choice by announcing the principal's preferred variety. As a result, the principal adopts competition procedure. The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 4. The principal uses appointment when the cost of public good provision is greater than or equal to the distance between the agents'bliss points (C 2 1 ). She uses competition when the cost of public good provision is lower than the distance between the agents'bliss points (C < 2 1 ).
Intuitively, under competition procedure, the agents face a standard cost-bene…t tradeo¤. Providing public good implies certain costs for a contributing agent but at the same time allows him to choose a public good variety closer to his bliss point. Obviously, when the cost exceeds the distance between the agents' bliss points (C 2 1 ) each agent prefers his counterpart to be selected and thus public good provision becomes unpopular. The agents (for some parameter values just one of them) tend to make themselves an unattractive choice and announce extreme varieties of the public good. The principal therefore picks appointment procedure to avoid extreme outcomes. However, when the cost is lower than the distance between the agents' bliss points (C < 2 1 ) neither agent would let his counterpart implement his preferred public good variety. In this case, the agents value the opportunity to provide the public good which makes them to announce more moderate varieties than their bliss points. The principal then picks competition procedure and ends up with a moderate variety of the public good.
Robustness
In this section, I relax some of the important assumptions of the model and discuss robustness of my results.
Exit of the agents Assume now that the agents are allowed to exit the competition stage.
Intuitively, the agents have incentive to exit only when production of the public good is an unpopular job. However, when the agents value the opportunity to implement a public good variety close to their bliss point, they don't want to exit the competition stage. In Appendix C, I formally show that for C < 2 1 neither agent has incentive to exit, while for C 2 1 at least one of the agents prefers to exit. Therefore, allowing exit a¤ects outcomes of the competition stage only when C To see this, consider …rst the case of large costs (C > 1) in which there is a unique equilibrium (0; 1) of the competition stage and both agents have incentive to exit. The agents strictly prefer the public good to be provided rather than not. Therefore, in the simultaneous exit game, only one of the agents ends up exiting. 2 If a more extreme agent exits then a more moderate agent announces his preferred variety in the competition stage and gets selected for public good provision. The principal is then indi¤erent between appointment and competition. However, if a more moderate agent exits then a more extreme agent gets selected. The principal then strictly prefers appointment to competition (as when exit is not allowed).
Consider next the case of C = 1 in which there are up to 3 equilibria depending on the parameter values. A symmetric equilibrium (0; 1) is discussed in the previous paragraph. In equilibrium (0; 2 ) agent 2 has incentive to exit. If agent 2 is a more extreme agent then his exit implies that a more moderate agent 1 will be selected in the competition stage. Therefore, the principal will be indi¤erent between appointment and competition. However, if agent 2 is a more moderate agent then his exit leads to a more extreme variety being implemented by agent 1. The principal then strictly prefers appointment to competition. The similar intuition works in the case of equilibrium ( 1 ; 1) in which agent 1 has incentive to exit. It follows therefore that for C = 1 the principal prefers appointment to competition (as if exit is not allowed). Preferences of the principal In the model, I assume that the principal's bliss point is As a result, the principal is indi¤erent between extreme varieties 0 and 1. Relaxing this 2 For simplicity, I disregard coordination issues here. assumption a¤ects some results of the competition stage. In particular, Proposition 1 about the lack of convergence in the competition stage no longer holds. Indeed, if the principal strictly prefers one extreme variety, say 0, to the other, 1, then for su¢ ciently large C it is easy to construct a convergent equilibrium, (1; 1) , in the competition stage. To see this, suppose that the agents announce the same varieties (1; 1) . Agent i's payo¤ is then equal to (0; 0) . However, this convergence result does not a¤ect the principal's decision regarding the selection procedure. Indeed, in this case the principal still prefers appointment to competition in order to avoid extreme outcomes.
Note moreover that relaxing the assumption about symmetry of the principal's preferences does not change the results for C 1 either. Indeed, the equilibrium structure of the competition stage stays una¤ected. (However, particular quantitative characteristics of the equilibria might change.) Still, the principal will prefer competition when the agents value the opportunity to provide a public good (i.e., when C < 2 1 ), and appointment when the agents want to avoid it (i.e., when C 
Conclusion
This paper builds a simple model of provision of a di¤erentiated public good within an organization. A principal can adopt di¤erent procedures (appointment or competition) to select one of two agents for the public good production. The agents have extreme opposite preferences over the di¤erentiated public good while the principal prefers a moderate variety. Under appointment, the principal just observes the agents'preferences and selects a contributor on the basis of this. Obviously, an agent with the preferences closer to those of the principal will be selected in this case. In turn, under competition, the agents announce public good varieties they commit to provide if selected. If the public good provision is quite costly then the agents want to avoid being selected and so make themselves an unattractive choice by announcing extreme varieties. The principal then prefers appointment to competition. However, if the public good provision is not very costly then each agent values (and therefore compete for) the chance to choose a public good variety closer to that he prefers the most. The agents thus want to make themselves an attractive choice and announce moderate varieties. The principal prefers competition to appointment in this case. Even though the model is very stylized, it yields an empirically testable prediction. My results suggest that appointment is preferred in the cases in which provision of a di¤erentiated public good implies considerable costs for a contributing agent and doesn't pay o¤ in terms of a public good variety. In turn, competition is preferred when provision of a di¤erentiated public good is not so costly and pays o¤ in terms of a public good variety. Therefore, a simple testable hypothesis might be as follows. Within organizations, production of unpopular public goods is simply assigned while production of popular public goods is contested.
Appendix

A. Proof of Proposition 2
Consider a pair of varieties (x 1 ; x 2 ) such that
Given these x 1 and x 2 , each agent gets selected with probability one-half. Agent 1's payo¤ is Therefore, both agents do not deviate from (x 1 ; x 2 ) such that x 1 = 1 x 2 , x 1 2 0; i ; ) takes its maximum value C when x 0 i = i . To guarantee that agent i has no pro…table deviations it is required i (0; 1) max i (x 0 i ; ), which amounts to C 1. Therefore, (0; 1) is an equilibrium for C 1.
B. Proof of Proposition 3
Characterization of an equilibrium in which the agents announce asymmetric varieties and agent 1 gets selected.
Consider a pair of announcements ( 1 ; x 2 ) such that 1 2 0; 1 2 and x 2 2 (1 1 ; 1]. Given those, agent 1 is selected for the public good provision and gets the payo¤ 1 ( 1 ; x 2 ) = C. The payo¤ of agent 2 is equal to 2 ( 1 ; x 2 ) = j 1 2 j.
1. If agent 1 deviates and announces a variety x 0 1 2 1 x 2 ; 1 2 , then he still gets selected and his payo¤ becomes 1 (x 0 1 ; x 2 ) = jx 0 1 1 j C. However, 1 (x 0 1 ; x 2 ) < 1 ( 1 ; x 2 ) and so such a deviation is not pro…table. If agent 1 deviates and announces a variety 1 x 2 , then each agent gets selected with probability one-half. Agent 1's payo¤ becomes Combining the conditions that guarantee that neither agent has pro…table deviations yields the set of the parameters for which there is an equilibrium with asymmetric announcements ( 1 ; x 2 ) with agent 1 selected for the public good provision:
Characterization of an equilibrium in which the agents announce asymmetric varieties and agent 2 gets selected.
Consider a pair of announcements (x 1 ; 2 ) such that 2 2 1 2 ; 1 and x 1 2 [0; 1 2 ). Given those, agent 2 is selected and gets the payo¤ 2 (x 1 ; 2 ) = C. The payo¤ of agent 1 is equal to 1 (x 1 ; 2 ) = j 2 1 j.
1. If agent 2 deviates and announces a variety x 0 2 2 1 2 ; 1 x 1 , then he still gets selected and his payo¤ becomes 2 (x 1 ; x 0 2 ) = jx 0 2 2 j C. However, 2 (x 1 ; x 0 2 ) < 2 (x 1 ; 2 ) and so such a deviation is not pro…table. If agent 2 deviates and announces a variety 1 x 1 , then each agent gets selected with probability one-half. Agent 2's payo¤ becomes Once the former inequality holds, the latter inequality will hold too since the former inequality implies 1 
C.
It follows then that in case 1 < 1 Combining the conditions that guarantee that neither agent has pro…table deviations yields the set of the parameters for which there is an equilibrium with asymmetric announcements (x 1 ; 2 ) with agent 2 selected for the public good provision: which is strictly lower than j j i j. Agent i therefore prefers to exit the competition stage.
2. When C = 1 there is a symmetric equilibrium (0; 1). As discussed in the previous case, agent i will exit competition. For C = 1, 1 2 0; Table 2 . Equilibria for C 2 (0; 1).
